subtitle will pique their interest is that it's become an article of faith among Marxists going back a century or more that capitalism and value are like conjoined twins with shared vital organs. There's just no means of separating them without killing-off both. Value in Marx is short (five chapters amounting 147 pages of text, plus notes and a bibliography), but also very dense and written with considerable authority. 4 Henderson hardly references secondary literature. His grasp of Marx's texts is so secure that he favours summary, paraphrase and thumbnails over stock quotations from key publications like Grundrisse. In what he calls 'mainline' interpretations of Capital and other late works by Marx, it looks something like this. In a society where (i) most adults must sell their capacity to work to others in order to live, where (ii) most goods and services are produced in order to realise a profit, and where (iii) private firms must compete and innovate to survive and prosper, the value of a commodity is not exhausted by its practical utility to consumers (what it can do), the price they are willing to pay for it (what it costs), what it 'says' to others (its sign-value), or the amount of time and skill invested by those who made it. That's because an individual commodity is the physical form taken by the ensemble of social relations between all employers and employees. For that ensemble to exist in time and space, and for profits, losses and wages to be distributed dynamically in changing proportions, the internal differences must be abstracted from. 'Value' is the name Marx gives this abstraction, the 'ghostly' substance made real by the fact it's measurable according to a single yardstick, the moving average Marx called 'socially necessary labour time'. This yardstick has a metric (clock time) but is much, much more than a measure. Value is quantitativeit's 'attached' to different commodities in definite proportions, ones not determined during the moment of production, but ex ante once these commodities have been sold for a certain price relative to others. But it's also qualitative: a single (albeit virtual) phenomenon whose mass and shape varies through the course of capitalist history. Such is the contradictory logic of accumulation that the life of valuesocially, spatially and temporally -is thoroughly dependent on devaluation (the decrease and eventual absence of value). In the mainline interpretation, only in capitalism does value take this form, making it a largely 'spontaneous' form of rule in which working people not only fail to capture the social wealth they actually create but are also dominated by the alienated goods and services they collectively manufacture (e.g. see Postone, 1993) . But the failure and the domination are not experienced uniformly by all working people, or all capitalists. Because value is always on the move historically and geographically, the costs and rewards of living in a commodity society are distributed unevenly.
Henderson does not reject this reading in which value is something to be eliminated in the name of 'associated production' consciously planned. Instead, he seeks to supplement it. He identifies unresolved tensions and explores blind-spots in Marx's writings about a world with, and without, capitalism. He analyses various essays, pamphlets and letters, as well as the major analytical works Marx was preparing concurrently. He thus covers Marx's critique of political economy, but also his more political writings directed at ostensible allies (such as the critique of Proudhon's 'utopian socialism'). It turns out that value in any alternative mode of producing and distributing goods and services will necessarily resemble its capitalist forebear. It persists: " … getting rid of capitalism does not mean getting rid of value.
By the same token, not getting rid of value does not mean instantiating a corrected capitalism" (p. xxiv). to-be mechanisms are devised to associate commodity producers qualitatively and quantitatively, they will, he insists, elude control just as surely as capitalist value does. Here, then, we have an enduring tension, if not necessarily a dialectic. To reproduce itself, any society must create associations and perform tasks that yield objects. In turn, these objects can take-on a life of their own that obscures or even compromises whatever relations and societal principles they are supposed to incarnate. These objects are necessities -they must be produced -and they constrain just as much as they enable. However configured in the detail, then, the 'value' that a society creates must forever fail, even as -from one perspective -it succeeds. In sum, Henderson's Marx " … comes to stand for the most difficult conceptual problems that must be endured rather than avoided" (Martin, op. cit. xxii) .
Is he offering a transhistorical theory of value that's anathema to most and how it can be changed in interaction. Its essence is … that it lacks essence" (pp.
142; 143). The value of certain sorts of art, Henderson concludes, is that they invite us to recognise the possibility of new forms of value that will, in their own way, become future means of new human becoming as well impediments to becoming. This, we might say, extends to Value in Marx itself, an object designed, in a fashion, to be a work of textual art enjoining us to acknowledge and contest all systems of social value. As geographer David B. Clarke puts it, "… all systems of value are destined to see their ambition humiliated, for as they approach their own limit they become subject to a fatal reversibility" (2010: 264). We might, Henderson opines, take a certain pleasure in this humiliation: the human project is forever incomplete and to hope for closure is to miss the point. 'renewing Marx's work so that it remains vibrant'. Henderson's conviction is that revisiting Marx on value will allow present-day readers to see new value in Marx. Yet, for me at least, his book misses the mark. It takes aim at a target that's surely the least of the contemporary Left's worries: namely, over-tidy and over-optimistic conceptions of alternatives to capitalism, present and future. Whatever their limitations, such conceptions -precisely by virtue of their utopian elements -appeal because they can move our hearts and minds. At a time when capitalism seems alarmingly impregnable, the Left needs to sustain a faith in the possibility of structural change (however remote that possibility is). 6 It also needs to explore the wiggle-room capitalism offers, which explains the serious talk -in some quarters, at least -about a Green New Deal, Transition Towns, and much else besides over the last 5 years or so. 7 If revolution is the stuff of fantasy, then muscular reform of contemporary capitalism should, at least, be a realistic dream.
6 I concur wholeheartedly here with Andrew Merrifield's insistence that "Politics more than anything else needs the magical touch of dream and desire, needs the shock of the poetic; left to professional career politicians, the political is always destined to feel stifled and lifeless and apolitical " (2009: 386) . 7 It's worth recalling here too that after 1945 many Marxists outside the communist bloc devoted huge intellectual energy to trying to specify how (i) capitalism could be reformed to reduce inequality, spread wealth and equalize life opportunities for people, and (ii) how the evident problems of actuallyexisting communism could be learnt from so as to replace capitalism with something more democratic and just. This energy was still evident after 'the Fall' of the 1989-91 period, when the likes of Alec Nove wrote about 'feasible socialism'. Today, the emphasis among the remaining cadre of Marxist analysts in the West is on explanation of capitalism's mutations and/or the political landscape of consent and dissent it has created. Much less emphasis is now devoted to forward-thinking about real alternatives, notwithstanding the plethora of 'anti-capitalist' movements evident since roughly 1998. Yet outside the Marxist fold proper proposals abound for reforming capitalism, pushing back its frontiers or removing it altogether. What does it say that the most talented living Marxists seem, in the main, reluctant to propose concrete options for world-changing? Critique has arguably become the default position. At a certain point this surely involves a sort of unwitting or unwilling complicity with the object one purports to want to alter or eliminate. We're bound to ask this of Henderson: why read Marx in this way, at this time?
He might reject the question, of course, since his point is that value is a perpetuum mobile: endless continuity and endless movement, regardless of circumstances. But such a rejection is itself surely circumstantial to some degree. To choose scholasticism as a resource or refuge implies other options forgone, some of which would have connected Henderson's analysis more directly to life before and after the Great He surely cares about why or whether chronic hunger, disease and poverty (will) persist. But we learn nothing about such earthly matters or a regime of value that might address basic human needs, let alone the 'higher' aspirations of 'species-being'.
Henderson offers no reason to believe that capitalist value can or should be superseded. 'Mainline' Marxists would surely demur and question the lack of immanence in his critique. This lack surely pivots, in significant measure, on Value in Marx obliges us to ask why we might choose to read Marx today in ways that fail to help us address the manifest maladies of capitalism. Are we free to value Marx so as to think beyond the capitalist value that's as deeply destructive as it is extraordinarily creative? I hope so, and I'm quite sure George Henderson does too.
